Africa: Political Dynamics in the Horn of Africa - an Analyst's Pitfall

23 April 2024
analysis

Debating Ideas reflects the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, often radical, scholarship, original and activist writing from within the African continent and beyond. It offers debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and reviews and responses flowing from the African Arguments books. It is edited and managed by the International African Institute, hosted at SOAS University of London, the owners of the book series of the same name.

I read the article "The Future of IGAD amidst Turmoil in the Horn" with some interest.

I do not intend to nit-pick. The piece is decent in many respects. In others, however, one is left with a sense that the author cobbled together several unrelated facts, and hoped for the best.

On the subject of multilateralism, the article takes an activist tone ill-suited to the objectives of the article. To claim, for example, that the region is "facing its worst moment..." implies that the author has a specific benchmark in mind, which they never quite reveal. If one were to rely solely on the reams of dismal regional analyses of the past 40 years, one would likely conclude that the Horn would have vanished by now.

The Horn and the greater East Africa region are currently grappling with two situations of internal armed conflicts, two troubled transitions, and the struggle for agency, shifting away from global bipolarity and middle power jostling.

Although this is far from ideal, it is certainly an improvement on the 1990s when almost every country in the region was engaged in direct or indirect conflict with its neighbours, while simultaneously dealing with its own internal problems. The governance and human development indicators show improvement, and political stability has increased. In the region and its diasporas, young and insatiable talent is driving numerous innovations in technology.

The author's mistake lies in claiming that there has been "...collapse of the political order in the Horn," which implies that order has disintegrated. Far from it. A more liberal interpretation would argue that the "political order" is simply growing and struggling under the weight of multidirectional pressures.

By all accounts, IGAD is outperforming the UN in the region and the continent. The latter's long list of unsuccessful peace-keeping missions, patchy mediations and dubious post-conflict interventions strongly attest to this. One would have to analyse and compare the accomplishments of UNAMID, UNISFA, OSEHOA, UNITAMS, MONUSCO and IGAD to determine which organisation is performing more effectively, despite IGAD's far more limited resources.

The author argues that transactional politics is undermining the norms-based order in the Horn. However, it is essential to recognise that politics and diplomacy inherently involve transactional interactions. Failing to acknowledge this foundational principle or assuming an alternative approach is possible would render any analysis fundamentally flawed.

Moreover, the norms-based order is being reshaped across the globe. It is, therefore, unrealistic to single out the Horn as if it were the only region affected by the complex geopolitical changes and the emerging multipolar global order. A comparative analysis of the behaviour of the region's states would have been more effective had it situated this argument within this global context. Sovereignty, military transactionalism, and alliances play a significant role in the emerging order.

By the same token, criticising IGAD's decision-making procedures out of context is not useful. IGAD makes decisions by consensus. There is no way IGAD could "compel" Ethiopia and Sudan, which have lately been "errant", to behave otherwise. As a matter of fact, IGAD criticised Ethiopia's behaviour while taking a more cautious approach to Sudan, wary of the Sudanese threat to withdraw its membership. It is important to note that almost all multilateral entities are consensus-based decision-making organisations. While the UN and AU arrive at consensus differently, the small size of IGAD means that all members must agree. In this context, compulsion, as the author may have desired, is not a viable option.

In the final sections of the piece, it was easy to detect the familiar stereotypes about Eritrea, a jaundiced view perpetuated by the Meles Zenawi personality cult in Western academia that continues to portray Eritrea as an African North Korea, perhaps to camouflage the massive limitations of its departed hero.

Similarly, the effectiveness of the Troika mechanism is emphasised, as if it were an innovative and successful solution that IGAD inexplicably overlooked. It is regrettable that the history of IGAD's interactions with the Troika approach has not been discussed. The process of decision-making at IGAD is governed by a Troika system, which includes the Chair, Executive Secretary, and Rapporteur, who are chosen from different Member States. The Chair works in conjunction with every Member State to create the Summit Agenda, with each member state having an equal right to propose or alter the agenda. The IGAD-PLUS mechanism for South Sudan, which was in place between 2014 and 2016, was designed to counteract the procrastination of the negotiating parties, which was caused by external influences from a different form of Troika (US, Norway, and the UK) that IGAD is familiar with.

The article also lacks an understanding of the intricacies of the Executive Secretary's office or the ongoing process of reinvention within IGAD. While the organisation undeniably has efficiency and effectiveness issues, and could do better, the solutions proposed are akin to a physician prescribing malaria medication for a patient just because they have a fever.

Overall, the article presents a series of disconnected events without a discernible connection to the underlying systemic forces that either unify or divide the region. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the region is shifting from conflict to competition in the domains of technology, economics, and human capital. This competition, however, is occurring in the face of lingering geographical, demographic, and historical factors, which may seem chaotic at first glance. A comprehensive grasp of the structural trends in the region would help to mitigate the alarmist tendencies running through the article, and provide a more accurate rendering of the region.

* The author is a former staff member of IGAD and observer of the Horn of Africa.

Debating Ideas aims to reflect the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, often radical, scholarship, original and activist writing from within the African continent and beyond. It offers debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and reviews and responses flowing from the African Arguments books.

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